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Defense Issues Council Publishes Report

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[FBIS Translated Text] Preface

Soon a half century will have passed since the Japanese people rallied from the midst of the physical and spiritual desolation brought about by World War II, and, with profound self-examination in their hearts, began their path to build a new Japan. Just at this time the peoples of the world are overcoming the hardships of the long cold war and, filled half with hope and half with uneasiness, are beginning to grope around, trying to carve out a new era. Japan, too, viewing the 21st century, is pressed by matters which it should reconsider afresh concerning the nation's future course. We are reaching a time when we will also have to fundamentally return to and study, from this kind of standpoint, security and the proper nature of the nation's defense capability.

In postwar Japan's fresh start we were given a framework for the new country's basic policy by the UN Charter outside Japan and the Constitution within Japan. But the principle of collective security which was espoused at the young United Nations was exposed to the harsh realities of international politics and rapidly lost its base for realization. The people of each nation recognized anew that the most certain foundation for a nation's safety is its self-defense capability. And they learned that in the situation of the major countries of the world confronting each other, centered on the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, there was no choice but to plan for the safety of their own country, with alliances with countries which share their basic interests and sense of values as the axis. Thus, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was chosen as a realistic foundation for the security policy of postwar Japan.

Japan, which achieved its reinstatement in the postwar international community by effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in April 1952, made the above choice at the end of serious debate. Since then, while cooperating with the United States, which has shouldered the largest share of responsibility for maintaining international order, Japan has accomplished its own economic revival and has contributed to the metamorphosis of the Asia-Pacific region, which a half-century ago was tormented by poverty and the devastation of war, into a region of peace and prosperity. If we look back at this path trod by postwar Japan, we can probably say that, on the whole, the choice was not mistaken.

Now, when the cold war has ended, the people of each nation are groping for the proper nature of a new world.

In this kind of situation, a trend has been born in Japan also, to try to rethink the proper nature of security and defense capability by taking them up as central political questions for the nation. The Japanese people, who have lived under an "uneasy peace" under the cold war, have now returned again to the starting point with a new feeling, and have begun to grapple seriously with the questions of world peace and Japan's security in the future.

As a private consultative body for the prime minister, this council has debated for over five months with the objective of reviewing the National Defense Program Outline, which had become a guide to the proper nature of defense capability up till now, and presenting the kind of thinking which would become the framework of a guide to replace it. The task of this council is, while taking into consideration the changes in the international environment after the cold war and the various changes confronting Japanese society, to indicate a direction for security policy that is adapted to a new era, and to make proposals on the new proper nature of defense capability based on that.

Chapter 1. The Post-Cold War World and the Asia-Pacific

1. The End of the Cold War and Qualitative Changes in the Security Environment

The format of East-West rivalry that constituted the basic framework of international politics for almost half a century following World War II collapsed along with the "Berlin Wall." The Western nations centered on the United States held fast to freedom and democracy and achieved sound economic growth, so the Soviet Union and other socialist countries fell into clear inferiority in the economic and technological competition. The Soviet Union's reforms, upon which it embarked with the aim of reconstruction as a powerful nation by recovering from its decline, brought about the successive collapse of the socialist systems of the nations of Eastern Europe, and in the end, the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO), which was made up of nations of the Eastern bloc, testifies most directly to the end of the cold war.

In the cold war era, not all regions of the globe and peoples of all countries experienced the effect of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the same way. Furthermore, the end of the cold war is exerting all sorts of influences on the various regions and countries. But as far as it relates to the proper nature of security questions, one cannot deny that the influence of the cold war has spread into every corner of the globe. And it is also difficult to deny that now, when the U.S.-Soviet confrontation has ended, the security environment has changed greatly from that up till now. To put the change concisely, while on the one hand the threat in a clearly visible form has disappeared, and moves toward arms control and arms reduction are progressing centered on the United States, Russia and

Europe, on the other hand, the opaque, uncertain situation is ensnaring us in uneasiness. To put it another way, there are dangers with all sorts of characteristics, which are dispersed and difficult to identify, and it has become difficult to learn in advance what form they will take and threaten our safety. Peace of mind has increased in the sense of having been liberated from a "balance of terror" which might fail at any time, but in the sense of preparing for a danger which is difficult to foresee and having to maintain a posture of responding rapidly without losing the opportunity, it can also be said that we are facing a more difficult security environment. Being insensitive to the appearance of new security problems that are coming into being with the end of the cold war will not be excused.

2. Multilateral Cooperation Centered on the United States

Two things constitute the realistic base of a security environment: the state of military capability and international systems for maintaining peace. The U.S. superiority in military capability became more secure with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The network of alliances that were built during the cold war era centered on the United States will probably be continued in the future also as stable factors in international relations. Among them, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the most representative. There is no possibility that a major power with the will and ability to challenge U.S. military capability head-on will appear in the near future.

However, the United States no longer has the kind of overwhelming superiority in overall national strength that it once had. Particularly in the field of economic power, a trend can be seen for competition to increase between the United States and other advanced countries as well as with newly industrialized countries. The result is that there is a possibility that the competitive economic relationship will grow stronger in the future. But we do not feel that it would become the trigger for an arms race in the classic sense would begin. Rather, all of the nations involved want to avoid falling into that kind of situation, so despite the generation of some degree of conflict of economic interests, it is anticipated that in the military and security aspects a cooperative relationship will continue centered on the United States.

The question is rather, whether, while holding that superior military power in the rear, the United States will be able to exercise leadership in multilateral cooperation. That will probably be determined to a certain degree by the behavior of countries that are in a position in which they should cooperate with the United States. Arrangements to solve security problems through international cooperation are still far from perfect, but, little by little, signs of their development have begun to appear, at both the UN level and the regional level.

3. The Role of the United Nations and Such as Mechanisms for Cooperative Security

The maintenance of multilateral cooperation centered on the United States is indispensable for the UN security mechanism to function. In the last few years the United Nations, which was unable to function fully under the harsh U.S.-Soviet confrontation, has actively expanded its peacekeeping activities and is expanding the scope of its activities both geographically and in terms of content. Whether this kind of activity by the United Nations will continue to develop will depend greatly on what kind of harmony is maintained among the five major powers that are the permanent members of the UN Security Council and such major countries as the G-7, including such countries as Japan and Germany, which are making large monetary contributions.

While the possibility of an across-the-board military confrontation is low, in the various regions and countries of the world, particularly in places with weak social bases, in which national unity is deficient, perhaps across national borders, perhaps within national borders, there have begun to be many cases in which disputes between various forces developed to the point of armed conflict. Dealing effectively with this kind of comparatively small-scale so-called regional conflict has become an important task for the sake of international peace.

On the other hand, because the fruits of economic development have begun to transcend the scope of the small number of advanced countries and expand to a greater number of countries and regions, the adjustment of economic interests has begun to be more complicated than heretofore. At present there are no indications that this kind of economic problem will develop into military conflicts, but they are charged with the danger that, if mistakes are made in their treatment, they could very well develop into new problems that threaten regional security and, by extension, the security of the entire globe. In the Asia-Pacific, which has many countries where nation-building has finally begun to get on track and where dynamic economic development is being accomplished, it is particularly necessary to pay careful attention to this kind of danger. Efforts to build relationships of political trust on a regional scale so that the precious fruits of economic development will not become a cause for an increase in political distrust because of a divergence of interests involving them, must be regarded as important from the viewpoint of security.

4. Four Types of Danger Anticipated in the Future

First, the kind of direct military confrontation between major countries that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the past is inconceivable at present. Consequently, even though we will not go so far as to say that the possibility of an armed conflict on a world scale is zero, it has decreased greatly. It is probable that every major power in the world will, for the present, devote its attention to domestic economic and social problems. Russia, which is experiencing the process of a difficult

conversion from a socialist system, and China, which is grappling with the change to a market economy, are also no exception to this. The question is whether in the future the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including these two countries, will continue to possess the will and ability to respond to their responsibility and play a constructive role in the international community. If cooperation among major powers centered on the United States is lost, there is danger that the security environment of the entire world will deteriorate at a single stroke.

Second, it is anticipated that many localized armed conflicts will erupt, and that their nature will become more complicated. Numerous "regional conflicts" of this kind also occurred in the cold war period. In that sense, they are not at all a new phenomenon, but they are new in the sense that the danger has receded that they would link directly to the tension between the two large camps as happened heretofore. There is also the aspect that the handling of regional conflicts by the international community is made easier by the fact that they have little connection to the interests of major powers; conversely, compared to the cold war period it has become more difficult for major powers to exercise their ability to coordinate, so fear that the situation will deteriorate without any effective measures to solve it being taken has also begun to develop.

Third, the danger of proliferation of weapons and military-related technology, which is both a cause and a result of local armed conflict, has increased. Conventional weapons aside, if proliferation of nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, and of missile technology, is allowed to take its course, the safety of the entire international community will probably be threatened. The danger is particularly grave that nuclear technology and materials will flow from the former Soviet Union and make their way into the hands of persons who do not obey international rules.

Fourth, what causes the kind of local armed conflicts mentioned above are economic poverty and social dissatisfaction, and loss of a nation's capacity to govern related to that. For example, care is necessary in regions that have many of the poorest countries and those where resources are abundant but regional stability is very low. If we fix our attention on this point, it seems to us that, in order to solve the security problem, it has become increasingly necessary not to deal with it simply by military means but to grapple with it in a comprehensive manner by freely using multiple means, including economic and technical assistance.

5. Special Characteristics of the Security Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

The large-scale danger that threatened the safety of the international community has receded for the present. But speaking from the economic and technological conditions of modern society, the globe has become increasingly interdependent, so it has become a structure in which even a local conflict can easily affect the entire international community. Japan's economy in particular

is formed with a deep relationship with all the regions of the world, beginning with high dependence on Middle East oil as its foundation, so its concern in regard to security reaches the whole world.

Nevertheless, it is also certain that Japan must have special concern for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. What we have stated up to this point in regard to the qualitative change in the problem of security in the post cold war world applies also to the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, as already mentioned, this region which is in the process of dynamic change has some special characteristics which must be given special attention in regard to security.

First, unlike the nations of Europe, which have built an advanced defense setup in order to prepare for the Soviet Union's powerful military threat, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mean a dramatic change in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific. Because of this, the level of military tension did not suddenly decline. Rather, the countries of this region have, in general, come to pay more attention to the problem of security than up to now and have come to direct a considerable part of their country's resources to enhancement of military power.

To the vast majority of the people of Asia the half-century following World War II was a period of creation in which they established their own nations and began to assert themselves in the international community as sovereign entities. The business of establishing a nation and of national unification are a big special characteristic of the history of Asia in the cold war period, and the fact that the energy of social construction flooded the peoples of this area is also one reason why Asia became a good stage for a fierce leadership struggle over the choice between the systems of the East and West.

It is not mysterious if, as the cold war ended and the influence of the two former superpowers receded in relative terms, the countries of Asia, filled with youthful vitality, began to seek more independent security policies. Behind the fact that Asian countries have come to grapple with the problem of security more seriously than they did up to now lies the situation that, accompanying the end of the cold war, power relationships in Asia are becoming more fluid. In any case, the primary characteristic of the security environment of this region is the fact that, in this way, many Asian countries, including China, have come to possess the political motive of aiming to increase their military power and economic base.

Second, the security system in the Asia-Pacific region is only at an immature stage in its formation. The tense relationship continues on both sides of the cease-fire line on the Korean peninsula, holding danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no easy way to solve the North-South division and to achieve a durable political reconciliation to materialize. Such things as the time and manner of national unification and the nature and

foreign-policy direction of the subsequent unified nation are difficult to forecast at this point.

China is blessed by an international environment of unprecedented stability in recent history and is pouring maximum energy into modernization, but it still has such unsolved problems as those surrounding the Taiwan Strait, the position of Hong Kong, and the expanding economic difference between its inland and coastal areas. As for the Indochina peninsula, the war in Cambodia has finally died down and Vietnam and the other countries are about to enter a period of building their economies, but it still cannot be said that danger of a rekindling of armed conflict has completely disappeared in Cambodia. Nor can one minimize the danger that the conflict among countries with interests involving right of possession of the islands scattered off the coast of China will develop into military conflict. These things all testify to the fact that conditions which are sufficiently stable politically and militarily still do not exist in this region.

Third, the geopolitical fact that the interests of the foremost military powers in the world, the United States, Russia and China, converge on the Asia-Pacific, particularly on the Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific region, is important. Traditionally, Russia and China are land powers with their foundation on the Eurasian continent, but, as their economic activity expands, their natures are becoming like the naval powers whose eyes are turned toward the Pacific. Furthermore, all of these three countries have nuclear arms. Especially in the case of Russia, a country on the other side of the Arctic circle which has nuclear weapons corresponding to the United States, it has a strong interest in the Northwest Pacific. Speaking from growing commercial profit in addition to the viewpoint of security, the United States will probably continue its interest in this region in the future. As a country located in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific, a region which is characterized by this kind of intersection of the interests of major world military powers, Japan must be sensitive to security problems.

Speaking from all of these special characteristics—the dynamism and energy possessed by Asian countries, the immaturity of the regional system for cooperative security, the intersection of interests of major military powers—the security environment of the Asia-Pacific contains both positive and negative possibilities. The time when Asia was only a passive stage for the pursuit of major-power interests has already ended. We cannot imagine that, moving into the 21st century, Asian countries that in the latter half of the 20th century reached the point of becoming autonomous nations will repeat a history of constant war in the same manner which the countries of Europe once experienced in the centuries when they devoted themselves to forming nations while competing with each other on a small continent. Because the geopolitical conditions are, of course, very different, and so is the environment in terms of era. In any case, all the more so because the Asia-Pacific is rich in opportunities and is a region in which major powers are deeply

involved, there is probably no doubt that the future trend in Asia will be an important factor in determining the future of world security. The responsibility of Japan and other related countries is great.

Chapter 2. Basic Thinking About Japan's Security Policy and Defensive Capabilities

1. An Active and Constructive Security Policy

As stated above, in the cold war era international security problems were discussed with the focus on development of the bipolar tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In security today, that kind of focus has been lost, and the opaque international order in which scattered, difficult-to-forecast dangers exist, has become the cause of our sense of insecurity. On the other hand, indications have begun to appear that the capacity for collective handling of disputes will continue to develop on the basis of major countries—centered on the United States—cooperating under such international systems as the United Nations, so one new direction is being suggested. Various dangers exist in today's security environment, but it will probably be possible for the international community to cooperate and prevent disputes before they arise, prevent expansion of disputes that have arisen, and continue to eliminate the causes which generate disputes. Thus, if the peoples of the world, in a spirit of cooperation, will act in an active and constructive manner to create a durable "structure of peace," they will also be producing a good opportunity to build a safer world than that up till now. But we must not forget that, in the present situation, each country cannot accomplish defense by itself alone, so along with maintaining its own defense capability, it must guarantee its safety by maintaining ties with allied nations.

Japan should escape from its rather passive security role up till now, and act in the future as an active builder of an order. Moreover, Japan bears a responsibility that it must do that. The intent of the United Nations Charter is to prohibit the use of military force as an instrument for settling international disputes. To Japan, which participates in economic activities on a global scale and which, moreover, has resolved that it should not take the path of becoming a major military power, for the international community to assume that kind of posture is very desirable in terms of its national interest. Consequently, to seek an active, constructive security policy and to make efforts for that purpose is not only Japan's contribution to the international community, but, above all, is also a responsibility of the Japanese people now and the future.

In order to fulfill this kind of responsibility Japan must grapple with it by making full use of all such policy means as diplomacy, economy, and defense. In other words, construction of a coherent comprehensive security policy is required. First is promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a world and regional scale, second is perfection of the functions related to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and third is to maintain a

highly reliable, efficient defense capability based on a further strengthened intelligence capability and a rapid crisis-response capability.

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation

The United Nations, which was established 50 years ago as a mechanism for collective security, is now finally awakening to its original function.

To begin with, the passage "the threat or use of force" which is found in Article 2, Section 4, of the UN Charter refers to actions that individual nations take independently as a means to solve international disputes. That point is also the same in the Paris Treaty of 1928 (a treaty related to abandonment of war), which is the source of the UN Charter. To put it another way, its rightful meaning is, as stated in the Preamble to the UN Charter, that "aside from the case of common benefit" to the international community, no nation whatever should use military power.

Actually, in Article 2, Section 3, the UN Charter requires member nations to solve "international disputes by peaceful means," and also stipulates in Section 4 that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Thus, all members of the United Nations have pledged to the entire international community that they will refrain from "the threat or use of force," and is consistent in spirit with the provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

But it is unavoidable that this function would be lost, for all practical purposes, in a case in which a major power which has special responsibility to support UN peace activities were, itself, to become a concerned party in an international dispute. As this shows, stability of the international environment is necessary in order for the UN collective security mechanism to display its rightful function. Now, when the cold war has ended and there is not a critical military rivalry among major powers, such conditions have been met in a minimal fashion. The question of to what extent the peoples of various nations will, by using this good opportunity, be able to accomplish real results in cooperative security and acquire that habit, is probably the decisive factor in divining the fate of the United Nations in the 21st century.

However, it looks as though development in a finished form of a UN collective security mechanism is still far in the future. What is sought from the United Nations at this stage is not so much dealing with armed conflict by a regular UN army based on Article 7 of the UN Charter, as it is for UN peacekeeping operations to become more diverse in response to the circumstances of such crises as protecting against and preventing expansion of armed conflicts that occur in unstable countries where the governing body is unclear, as well as assistance in rebuilding order after the end of the dispute. Japan must

participate actively in these peacekeeping operations to the extent possible, and should put effort into preparing systems and capabilities for that purpose.

Furthermore, at this point we want to stress that the public-welfare aspect of peacekeeping operations and peace-building after bringing a dispute under control are important fields for international cooperation on security. Japan ought to be able to make particularly meaningful contributions in this field. On the government level, Japan should, for example, actively use development assistance (ODA [official development assistance]) policy for this purpose. Furthermore, voluntary participation by the private sector is particularly meaningful on this point, so the entire society should grapple with it seriously in such a way as to enliven the activities of nongovernment organizations (NGO).

On the other hand, the danger that clashes of interests among nations will develop into armed conflict has, of course, not vanished. The fact that each country has self-defense capability as a guard against the ultimate is accepted so long as it stays within the framework of the exercise of the right of self-defense. But the danger of an armed conflict will probably increase if those countries race to build up military power while harboring extreme mutual distrust. As a consequence, it is first necessary to approach, even slightly, a state of mutual trust by lowering the level of mutual distrust and, conversely, by increasing the sense of security. In order to do that, effort will be necessary to make effective the systems of arms control on a worldwide and regional scale. A system of registering movement of conventional weapons, which was established by the United Nations at Japan's suggestion, has already been implemented. Moreover, preventing the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related technologies is an important concern which is common to mankind, so Japan should put more effort than heretofore into strengthening systems of international control and monitoring for that purpose.

Cooperative security policies must be promoted not only in the United Nations but also at the regional level. Dialogue among member nations regarding security has already begun at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Japan has participated actively from the very beginning in the establishment of this forum, and it will also be necessary to give attention to it in the future. For example, such issues as establishment of a regional system for the purpose of mutual release of intelligence related to such things as movement and acquisition of weapons, disposition of military strength, and military exercises and increasing transparency, or creating a mechanism for cooperation related to prevention of disasters at sea, safety in maritime transportation, and peacekeeping activities, should probably be taken up there. The private-sector level Security Cooperation Conference of the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was recently started as something to supplement government-level regional dialogue. If dialogue with such nations as

China, Russia, and in due course, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the countries of Indochina, for which information related to military policy is difficult to obtain, progresses through this kind of venue, the degree of transparency of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific will increase, and the sense of security among the countries of the region will probably increase because of that.

Some signs of a multilateral security dialogue on the Northeast Asia- Northwest Pacific region have begun to be visible, such as the experiment of a quasi-private-sector five-nation forum made up of Japan, the United States, China, the Republic of Korea, and Russia, but participation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has yet to be realized. At the government level, we should probably strive to mutually increase the degree of transparency by promoting bilateral military exchanges individually with such countries as the Republic of Korea, China, and Russia.

The day when the countries of the Asia-Pacific region cooperate and have a permanent regional system for the purpose of engaging in UN peacekeeping operations is probably still in the future. But some countries in the region gained experience in cooperation in this field through participation in the Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Japan can learn more about regional cooperation by promoting exchange with such countries as Australia and Canada, which have a great deal of experience in UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, Japan should probably make efforts to continue to expand the base for regional security by gaining as much experience as possible in such things on the military side as mutual visits, exchange of research, study in each other's country, and joint training with the United States and other foreign countries.

3. Perfection of the Function of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship

Close, wide-ranging cooperation and joint work between Japan and the United States is indispensable both for the purpose of making Japan's own safety still more certain and for the purpose of making multilateral security cooperation effective. The institutional framework for that is provided by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. What Japan and the United States should strive for in the future is to further enrich the cooperative relationship of the two countries by making use of this framework in order to be able to deal more actively with new security needs.

In Europe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established against the background of cold war era East-West rivalry; in Asia also, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded against the background of such things as the outbreak of the Korean war. But if we consider the fact that international cooperation centered on the United States constitutes a realistic foundation for even a post-cold war security system, there is reason

for these treaty organizations to be taken over as precious assets for the building of new security systems.

Cooperation between Japan and the United States is also an indispensable element of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. For Japan and the United States to renew their determination to continue to maintain their security relationship has great significance for continuing to guarantee the U.S. commitment to this region which many Asian nations desire. Depending on U.S. fiscal considerations and assessment of the military situation, there may be some revision of its setup in Asia. Furthermore, some changes have already occurred in the U.S. military presence, as can be seen in its withdrawal from Philippine bases and the conclusion of a new agreement with Singapore on the use of military facilities. For the United States to also continue to maintain in the future the framework for security cooperation that has been developed in various ways with such countries of the region as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Singapore, the Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand has great significance for the stability of this entire region, so it is desirable that the countries concerned cooperate in that kind of direction.

When we look at things from this kind of broad international and regional viewpoint, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty probably comes to assume an even more important meaning than heretofore. Moreover, it is also necessary to appreciate anew this treaty's significance from the perspective of forming a framework that is indispensable to the active, constructive security policy that Japan should adopt. Consequently, various kinds of policy considerations and institutional improvements must be made in order to make the continuation of this treaty more certain and to devise its smoother application.

4. Maintenance and Use of Highly Reliable, Efficient Defense Capability

It is still true that the ultimate foundation of security is the resolve of a people to defend itself, and the maintenance of appropriate means for that purpose. Self-defense capability is, so to speak, the concrete manifestation of the ability to control oneself and the ability to manage crises as a nation. If we look at the fact that armed conflicts are now breaking out one after the other in regions where many countries lacked that ability, it is obvious that international security begins first with the establishment of countries that have the stable ability to manage crises.

Japan's own defense setup must be strong in order to enhance the reliability of the Japan-U.S. security setup and to participate actively and constructively in multilateral security cooperation. In order to do that, it is necessary to enhance the intelligence capability and danger-prediction capability of the Self-Defense Forces, prepare the kind of setup that will be able to respond to crises with certainty, and create for future use the kind of policymaking mechanism that will be able to operate in that manner.

It is also true that such a self-defense capability must be harmonious within the international security environment. In that sense, deciding the quality and size of appropriate defense capability is certainly not easy; but after having made its foundation the security environment which surrounds Japan and the mission of the Self-Defense Forces in that environment, the quality and size of the defense capability that Japan should maintain in peacetime will probably be arrived at by considering such factors as the relationship with allies, the geographical characteristics of the Japanese islands, the level of military technology, the economic situation, and the size and makeup of the population. Up until now, the concept of basic defense capability has been used to express that kind of defense capability. This concept continues to have meaning even in an era of cooperative security like today.

In the future, it will be imperative, even while making the best use of the concept of basic defense capability, to attempt to rationalize organization by making a distinction between those functions which should be strengthened and amplified and those which should be reduced and eliminated in response to new security environments and by considering also the appropriate allocation of financial and human resources. The concrete form of a proper defense capability will be discussed in Chapter 3, but important points include 1) an intelligence function to increase the ability to predict danger beforehand, 2) the function of rapid-response at an early stage of materialization of danger, and 3) the flexibility to prepare for the unlikely case that the danger will expand.

Chapter 3. The Proper Nature of Defense Capability in a New Era

From a Cold War Defense Strategy to a Multilateral Security Strategy

Japan's defense capability in the cold war era was predicated on the stationing and assistance of U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and was prepared and maintained with preparation for attacks by hostile forces against Japanese territory as its main point; and it also had as its objective guaranteeing the safety of maritime transportation, which is vitally important to maintaining the national livelihood. Japan has taken as its mission solely the defense of its own country based on the right of individual self-defense; but speaking from its location in terms of geography, it has naturally played an important role in the Western camp's strategy toward the Soviet Union.

Even in the cold war era things did not reach a direct military showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union; rather, the main form of international conflict was regional armed conflicts, with the rivalry of these two nations as a backdrop. In these regional conflicts, chief of which were the Korean war, which occurred when Japan was still controlled by the United Nations, and the Vietnam war, Japan fulfilled a role as a rear base that supported the operation of U.S. Forces.

Along with the end of the cold war, the security environment that surrounds Japan has changed greatly, but its essential role of defending itself transcended the change in era and is unchanged. Moreover, there is also no difference from the situation up till now in the fact that cooperation between Japan and the United States will be an important pillar of Japan's security policy in the future also. But the important question in the future will be how to assign a position to that kind of defense capability and security policy from the viewpoint of cooperative security.

Section 1. The Role of Defense Capability for the Purpose of Multilateral Security Cooperation

As we have stated through the previous chapter, the main task of international security in the new era will be to prevent deterioration of the security environment by responding in a suitable manner to dangers of diverse nature which occur in various areas of the world, and also to continue to actively improve that environment. In order to do that, it is vital that each country actively grapple with the task by cooperating with each other from a constructive perspective in order to increase the safety of the entire world and of each region, through such things as the United Nations and other organizations, with alliance relationships as the foundation. Japan, whose connection to the international community has become this large, is in a position where, on this point also, it should shoulder large responsibility in proportion to that connection. Japan's defense capability also has a role that it should fulfill in that kind of multilateral cooperation for international security.

1. Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of the Self-Defense Forces

In 1992 Japan enacted the UN Peace Cooperation Act and chose a posture of cooperating in earnest with United Nations peacekeeping operations, including participation by the Self-Defense Forces. As is clear in light of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's raising the question in "Tasks for Peace," and in several examples in which it is actually being put into practice, the actual form of UN peacekeeping operations is that it is gaining experience through its very content and concept being forced to adapt to a new environment. There is no doubt that the United Nations is finally beginning to move toward the United Nations which should exist.

When we look at it that way, we should probably emphasize again that an important pillar of Japan's future security policy lies in its active participation in strengthening the United Nations' function for international peace, beginning with further perfection of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, committing firmly to this kind of international trend related to security problems is important in the sense that it is a role befitting Japan's international position. Furthermore, to strive toward that goal is also very important in terms of national interest in the sense that the closer we really approach the idea of "a world without war," which the UN Charter

espouses, the easier a world it will be to live in for countries like Japan that aspire to proper pacifism. There is no reason for the Self-Defense Forces, whose greatest mission is to secure Japan's safety, to avoid this task. From that perspective, some improvements are necessary in such aspects as law related to use of the Self-Defense Forces, unit organization, equipment, and training.

- a) **Peacekeeping Operations and the Mission of the Self-Defense Forces:** First, it is essential to consider as an important mission of the Self-Defense Forces, parallel to its primary mission of national defense, active participation, insofar as possible, in all sorts of multilateral cooperation with the goal of international security carried out under the framework of the United Nations, beginning with peacekeeping operations. From that sense, measures that should be adopted include improving the legal system, beginning with revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act, in order to add participation in peacekeeping operations to the main duties of the Self-Defense Forces and improvements in the organization of the Self-Defense Forces that address participation in peacekeeping operations. In addition, it would be well to study thoroughly such matters as the use of Self-Defense Forces facilities for such objectives as training centers and the stockpiling of goods and equipment for peacekeeping operations, and Japan doing things like providing necessary equipment for peacekeeping operations carried out by other countries. Such measures have the meaning of providing international public goods for the purpose of peace.

At present, there are cases in which peacekeeping operations, which attract the most attention as a role of the United Nations, require the use of weapons within certain bounds, but viewed from the already-mentioned objectives of the United Nations, it is something that is naturally sanctioned. From that viewpoint, the government should probably make an effort in the future to obtain the understanding of domestic and foreign public opinion. And the kind of methods and limits by which it is permissible for Japan to participate in peacekeeping operations is a question that should be judged in a comprehensive manner, taking into consideration various points, of which the foremost is an estimate of the extent to which Japan possesses the means to make a significant contribution for that purpose.

The idea exists in some quarters that we should have an organization other than the Self-Defense Forces and assign it to peacekeeping operations, but that would be meaningless if the object is to avoid doubts in regard to the Constitution. Whatever its name, an organization that participates in the military sector of peacekeeping operations will be regarded internationally as a military organization, and will, for example, be treated as a "foreign army" in agreements on status. Furthermore, considering that the United

Nations designates such things as branch of service and rank when it requests the dispatch of necessary personnel from each country, the fact that it would be treated as a military organization is unchanged, even if it is an organization other than the Self-Defense Forces. Moreover, if Japan establishes, separately from the Self-Defense Forces, an organization like a peacekeeping unit, whose sole objective is international cooperation, it could very well cause foreign countries to harbor the suspicion that in practical terms it would lead to a military buildup. Rather, by giving the Self-Defense Forces an opportunity to participate in such things as UN peacekeeping operations, at home it will broaden the international outlook of the Self-Defense Forces and defense authorities and fortify the Japanese people's understanding of the Self-Defense Forces; overseas, it will increase transparency related to the real image of the Self-Defense Forces, and in its turn, probably contribute greatly to increasing trust toward Japan.

- b) **Organizational Improvement of the Self-Defense Forces:** In line with the kind of objectives stated above, a series of improvements is also necessary in the organization of the Self-Defense Forces. Up to now we have hypothesized the situation of a "limited, small-scale invasion" of Japan, so the Self-Defense Forces have systems with the organization, composition, and equipment to deal with that and have conducted education and training corresponding to that. Recent participation in some peacekeeping operations was also of a scope that could be handled within the framework of existing organization, equipment, and training. Fortunately, when we look at the example of Cambodia, for instance, the education and training up to now and the experience in disaster relief were sufficiently helpful, and it was possible to achieve enough real results to also receive a high evaluation internationally.

But it is conceivable that, in the future, cases will also increase in which Japan is asked to participate in this kind of activity, so we will probably require a more systematic approach to prepare for that eventuality. Peacekeeping operations are: first, and above all, operations in environments that are very different culturally, geographically, and politically from that in Japan; second, international joint action with similar organizations of other countries; and third, something of a different nature from fundamental military operations. Consequently, there is the danger that if we responded each time in a makeshift manner, it would become impossible to discharge adequately the duty that was required. Still more, it is anticipated that cases in which a rapid response is required will be more numerous in future peacekeeping operations, so the necessity to arrange regular training has increased more and more.

To be precise, the following improvements should probably be made, centered on the organizational and institutional aspect and the aspect of equipment.

First, on the organizational and institutional aspect, it is necessary to establish a specialized organization that has the functions of widely gathering and organizing information related to peacekeeping operations and other international cooperation, conducting specialized education and training for necessary personnel, and drafting and coordinating plans for implementation. In connection with that, it is desirable to gather various kinds of experience by dispatching self-defense personnel to UN missions. Concerning enforcement units, it would be unrealistic at present to have a permanent special unit that engages only in peacekeeping operations, so it should be avoided. Instead of that, it is better to adopt the method of assigning to peacekeeping operations units and personnel that have responded to occasional missions. Next, in the aspect of equipment also, equipment required along with participation in peacekeeping operations (for example, such things as equipment necessary for bivouacking at the actual location and for the security of unit personnel) should probably be prepared. Furthermore, it is best for the government to decide in advance, by some standard and drawing on lessons from past experience, what type of unit is suitable to participate in peacekeeping operations and in what kind of case.

- c) **Points for Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act:** In regard to the style of Self-Defense Forces participation in peacekeeping operations, it is desirable to boil down the discussion in the direction of eliminating as soon as possible provisions of the current International Peace Cooperation Act which freeze the primary work of the so-called Peacekeeping Force (PKF). In connection with this, Japan, too, should study the common understanding which is generally recognized by the United Nations regarding the use of weapons. Furthermore, we think that the function of the United Nations in regard to security, including peacekeeping operations, will in the future, while gaining experience, go on being improved and perfected in a way which will make it possible to better adapt to new necessities, so Japan, too, should continue to search for a proper form while taking lessons from experience up to now.

2. Other International Cooperation in Regard to Security

Even apart from peacekeeping operations, the field of international cooperative activities carried out by the United Nations and its specialized agencies or by non-government organizations (NGO) related to security is expanding. Within that, there is the example of various kinds of international relief activities for humanitarian objectives which are incorporated in the current International Peace Cooperation Act as something to which the Self-Defense Forces can contribute. Even other than that, there are things which are within the capacity of the

Self-Defense Forces to support, for example, even such things as refugee relief activities which are carried out within the framework of international cooperation.

- a) **International Cooperation for the Purpose of Arms Control:** In regard to arms control, various kinds of effort are being tried, both globally and regionally, related to measures which foster trust, and Japan also has made a large contribution. International cooperation in this field has also become increasingly necessary in order to prevent the uncertain, opaque, post-cold war security environment from turning in a dangerous direction. Speaking in regard to the Self-Defense Forces, up to now there are such examples as participation in various kinds of arms control-related conferences at the United Nations and elsewhere, and the dispatch of necessary personnel to monitor the scrapping of Iraq's chemical weapons. As a problem in the near future, it is desirable, for example, to dispatch self-defense personnel who are well-versed in chemical weapons to the secretariat of the treaty organization as inspectors, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention which is expected to take effect in 1995. Furthermore, such things as disposal of weapons that have been accumulated in the past, and of chemical weapons and mines which remain abandoned on battlefields, are tasks for the future. Consideration must also be given to the fact that, when carrying out this kind of task, it will be necessary to grapple with it on a unit scale.

It is anticipated that there will probably be more situations in the future in which Self-Defense Forces personnel should participate in this way in fields in which capable persons who possess specialized military knowledge and experience are required.

- b) **Promotion of Dialogue on Security:** As mentioned earlier, in Chapter 2, dialogue at various levels, aimed at fostering trust, has also begun in the Asia-Pacific region. It is important that military and security related persons from the related countries participate actively in the various kinds of security dialogue.

In addition, it would be best for such things as exchanging friendly visits by training fleets and joint exercises with units from neighboring countries to be promoted from the sense that they are helpful in increasing mutual transparency. Furthermore, from a similar objective, and also from the objective of nurturing defense-related persons who are able to be active internationally, mutual exchange, with all countries, of researchers and persons in charge of policy, and exchange of students studying defense should also be put into operation more actively than heretofore; the government, too, must not neglect necessary measures, including the aspects of personnel and government finance.

Section 2. Perfection of the Japan-U.S. Cooperative Relationship on Security

Even in the post-cold war security environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is still a necessary precondition for Japan's own defense. Not only that, it is thought that the fields in which Japan can continue to cooperate on Asian security hand in hand with the United States will expand increasingly in the future. We must view the cooperative relationship of Japan and the United States in regard to security, not only from a bilateral perspective, but as something which, at the same time, concerns the security of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

For example, providing U.S. Forces stationed in Japan with bases and related facilities within Japan and assisting in such areas as fiscal measures which are necessary to their maintenance should be evaluated from that kind of meaning. In addition, it is necessary to continue to build a cooperative relationship that is more flexible and active than that up to now in the area of operations. That kind of cooperation between Japan and the United States will become a cornerstone for ensuring the safety of this region and, in turn, of the entire world. We should appreciate anew the importance of the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship on security from the standpoint of this kind of active "alliance for peace."

Of course, it will not do to ignore the fact that Japan's own safety depends greatly on military cooperation between Japan and the United States. The U.S. nuclear deterrent, in particular, will be indispensable to Japan's safety as long as there are nations which have nuclear weapons. In the United States, movements have also begun at the private level espousing nuclear arms reduction by the five major nuclear powers, including their own country, as a start, and total extinction of nuclear weapons as a long-term objective. On the other hand, the U.S. Government makes preventing the advent of new nuclear powers, and appealing to Russia and other countries to exert themselves for nuclear arms reduction, urgent and important policy goals. Japan is determined to firmly maintain its policy of no nuclear arms, so both of these goals are completely in accord with Japan's interest. At the same time, it is decisively important that there be no fluctuation in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent until these two goals are really achieved. On this point also, there is a close, inseparable relationship between the maintenance and strengthening of Japan-U.S. cooperation on security and the long-term peace strategy of creating a world free from nuclear weapons.

In order to attempt to promote the Japan-U.S. cooperative security relationship at a more routine level, Japan should probably give attention to establishment of interoperability reaching to such wide-ranging fields as combat operations; command, control, and communications; rear area support, and equipment procurement, and to promote improvement on points like the following.

1. Perfection of Policy Consultation and Exchange of Information: We should further further strengthen

the relationship of mutual trust by further promoting policy consultation between Japan and the United States, and exchange of information for that purpose.

2. Promotion of a Setup for Operational Cooperation: It is necessary to attempt perfection of such things as joint planning, joint research, and joint training for unit operations which assume various kinds of situations.
3. Preparation of a Cooperation Setup in Rear Area Support: Japan, too, should promptly conclude the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) which the United States has concluded with NATO and other allies with the objective of facilitating mutual provision of rear area support, supplies, and services.
4. Promotion of Cooperation in the Area of Equipment: In facilitating joint operations with U.S. Forces, we must also give serious attention to commonality of equipment systems, beginning with C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence). Furthermore, it is anticipated that the mainstream of the weapons and equipment required in the future will be those that are highly advanced in quality, but not required in large quantities. Joint research, development, and production with the United States and other advanced countries is probably one rational option for satisfying this type of demand. In addition, technology developed by the private sector will be involved in this problem, so it is vital that the Japanese Government request the concerned foreign countries to adopt the necessary measures so as to not harm the interest of the enterprises in question.
5. Improvement of the Setup for Supporting U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan: Formerly the Japanese Government, under an agreement on status, has borne a portion of the cost related to U.S. Forces stationed in Japan, and in recent years it has concluded a special agreement and further increased that proportion. This kind of burden will be necessary in the future also, but there may be room for technical improvement, such as striving for flexibility in use of expenditures. In addition, it is desirable to continuously push ahead with improving the joint use of these facilities by Japan and the United States. Furthermore, we should plan to eliminate and integrate those facilities, as needed, in the future also.

Section 3. Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability

Even though the trend in international security after the cold war is shifting from a confrontation model to a cooperation model, it does not mean that the sources of various kinds of military danger have disappeared at one stroke. The fact that the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region is fluid for various reasons is just as already described in Chapter 1. Speaking from this kind of situation, there is no change in the fact that the

foundation of security is that each nation must have the ability to control and deal with crises beforehand. Furthermore, one must not shut one's eyes to the fact that arrangements for multilateral security through the United Nations and other agencies will not be able to demonstrate effectiveness unless at least the world's major powers possess that kind of capability. In that sense, having a reliable self-defense capability, as well as being the ultimate guarantee of maintaining the security of one's own country, is desirable also from the standpoint of international security.

1. Anticipated Military Dangers

In the cold war era, when military confrontation divided into the Eastern and Western blocs hung over the entire world, Japan's defense, also, was assigned a position in the great diagram of East-West rivalry. For example, it was virtually impossible that the Soviet Union would ignore the relationship to the Western side as a whole, and make Japan alone the object of a full-scale attack. The National Defense Program Outline of 1976 established the level of defense capability which Japan should possess as that able to deal with "limited, small-scale invasion" because it took as its premise the ability of U.S. Forces to prevent an invasion of Japan by the opponent's side, and to eliminate it in the event that an invasion actually occurred. That is, it was considered that the military capabilities of Japan and the United States, which supplemented each other, would be expected to unite and deal with Soviet aggression. As a result of having that kind of strategic concept as a premise as well as constitutional limitations and political considerations, Japan did not go beyond having defense capability of moderate scale and nature even during the cold war. It is so-called "basic defense capability."

Now, the form and nature of military threats have changed, but, basically, the view that, as an independent nation, Japan should possess minimum basic defense capability, has not lost its soundness even today. The possibility that military aggression on the scale assumed up to now would be directly inflicted on Japan has declined greatly. This does not mean that we can decide that never again will the political relationship with some country or other drastically deteriorate and the possibility of military aggression from that country increase; but the appearance of a nation like the former Soviet Union, which was prepared to oppose the United States both politically and militarily, will probably not happen in the near future. We ought to be able to predict, with a considerable time margin, the appearance of a threat of that kind, so Japan's side, too, will probably have an adequate period for preparation. The proper nature of defense capability in such a case should be studied anew in light of the situation at that time.

What we should give attention at present are the various kinds of danger that lurk in a situation which is unstable and difficult to forecast. It is necessary to maintain the capability to deal firmly and swiftly with that kind of

danger in the event that it is actualized, and to control it in such a way that it will not develop into a large-scale conflict. In particular, we should emphasize, even within that, the capability to deal with situations like interference with the safety of maritime transportation, invasion of air space, limited missile attacks, illegal occupation of part of Japan, all kinds of acts of terrorism, and an influx of armed refugees.

2. Factors That Should Be Considered in Preparing Defense Capability

Needless to say, the main factor that should be considered when deciding future defense capability is recognition of the kind of situations described above; on the other hand, it will also be necessary to consider trends in military technology in recent years and optimum allocation of resources for the country as a whole.

- a) Trends in Military Scientific Technology: There are notable factors in the change to high-performance weapons that has accompanied progress in scientific technology in recent years. The emphasis has begun to change greatly from the large, heavy weapons used heretofore to compact, high-performance precision guided weapons, and a reduction in labor in line with that has also progressed. Furthermore, the change to higher performance in such command, control, communications, and intelligence systems as use of satellites is also striking, so all such types of C3I systems as intelligence networks have begun to occupy a very important position. Software superiority or inferiority, in particular, influences the capability of equipment, so software will probably be given increasing prominence in the future. This kind of increase in equipment performance will make weapons systems more complicated, so it will probably produce sharp increases in the cost of weapons. The cultivation of necessary personnel who will master the research, development, and manufacture of this kind of high-performance weapon is not possible in a short period of time, so plans based on a long-term perspective will be required.
- b) Long-Term Trend Toward a Decrease in the Population of the Young: Another long-term factor is the trend toward a decrease in the younger population. The problem of deterioration of the conditions for securing personnel as a result of that has already also been pointed out in the Mid-Term Defense Plan (1991 through 1995). When we look at this in the light of the future outlook for population movement, it is estimated that the recruitment pool for male privates second class (males from 18 to just below 27 years old), who make up the major part of employment of short-term self-defense personnel will decrease drastically from fiscal year 1995 onward, with 1994's approximately 9 million as the peak. In particular, we must be prepared for a decrease of roughly 40 percent, 15 years from now, in the number of 18-year-old males, who constitute the nucleus of that. If we take

this kind of population as a premise, it will probably be necessary in the future to prepare defense capability in the direction of economy of human resources.

- c) **Stringent Fiscal Limitations:** The phenomenon of an aging population will also lead to fiscal pressure. Because it is estimated that the social security-related budget will increase greatly as the aging progresses, there is little possibility that the fiscal situation in regard to perfection of defense capability will improve over the long term.

Even were such not the case, over many years Japan's defense expenditures have, for the most part, been kept to 1 percent of GNP or less. Its share of the general-account budget also has fluctuated at a level of about 6 percent. Thus, it certainly cannot be said that allocation of resources to the field of defense is large compared with other countries. Moreover, there is a trend for the cost of equipment and the personnel cost per self-defense officer also to inevitably become high in comparison with countries that use conscription systems and in which cost-reduction measures can be adopted which calculate on the arms markets of foreign countries. Furthermore, a considerable part (approximately 11 percent in the fiscal year 1994 budget) is allocated to the cost of measures for bases and to the cost of assisting the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. Thus, from the outset, the real cost of defense is not as great as it appears.

As to perfection of defense capability in the future, it will be required more than heretofore that we put effort into preventing a decline in the level of defense capability by using a limited budget with maximum effectiveness.

Moreover, such obligatory costs as personnel costs for members of the Self-Defense Forces and payment for equipment contracted for in the past account for most of the cost of defense. In light of this kind of special nature, it is difficult to implement increases or decreases in defense expenditure on a single fiscal year basis, so it is appropriate to manage it based on a mid-to-long-term viewpoint.

3. Basic Thinking on New Defense Capability

If we take into account recognition of the above kind of situation, trends in military technology and budgetary restrictions, it is probably appropriate to employ ideas such as the following as the basic proper nature of future defense capability. That is, make those revisions which are necessary to adapt to a new strategic environment, while making the best use of the concept of basic defense capability. To be precise: First, perfect an intelligence function that is capable of dealing with an opaque security environment and prepare an operations setup so as to be able to deal appropriately with diverse dangers. Second, perfect the function and quality of combat units by reorganizing them into more efficient entities and

devising such means as attempting to modernize and equipment and make it more high-tech, while on the other hand reducing their scale overall. Third, emphasize flexibility, so that we can deal effectively with a situation of greater magnitude in the event that one arises. We hope that reform and reorganization of defense capability will be implemented in due order, with a target of 10 years from now.

4. Specific Reform Measures

- (i) **Perfection of C3I Systems:** In an era in which highly mobile military technology is spreading generally, the necessity of organizing defense C3I in dealing with dangers grew. In particular, the capability to respond in a swift and flexible manner must be emphasized in order to handle various kinds of danger by a defense capability of limited scale. Defense against a quantitatively superior offensive capability becomes possible only by swiftly and accurately grasping the situation and disposing the necessary military force at the necessary time and in the necessary place. For that, it is essential to possess a well-organized C3I system, so we should plan to utilize all types of sensors, including the use of reconnaissance satellites. The necessity of enhancing intelligence gathering and analysis capability and all types of warning and monitoring capabilities has been pointed out for some years, even, for example, in the National Defense Program Outline; but it will be necessary to emphasize this point still more in the future, the more so because a trend can be observed for danger to disperse and proliferate in the opaque international situation after the cold war, and also in order to contribute to prompt decisionmaking by perceiving changes in the situation at an early stage.
- (ii) **Strengthening the Setup for Combined Operation:** Strengthening the setup for combined operation by the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces is an urgent task in order to effectively execute new missions, starting with UN peacekeeping operations, and also in order to increase the ability to deal promptly with all kinds of dangers which originate in the opaque international situation. Smooth cooperation between Japan and the United States will probably be indispensable in many cases, so it is necessary from that point also. Strengthening from a combined viewpoint is particularly necessary in regard to the strategic intelligence function and the command and communications functions. In connection with that, it is by all means necessary to further strengthen the combined coordination function by disposition of necessary staff and by broadening the coordination fields of the Joint Staff Council and its chiefs.
- (iii) **Enhancement of Mobility and Adaptability:** In order to operate a limited-scale defense capability effectively, it is essential to be able to commit it at

the necessary place and at the necessary time; from that standpoint, enhancement of mobility and adaptability is necessary.

- (iv) **Scale of Manpower:** Taking into consideration the limitations that will arise from the population movement which can be anticipated in the future, it is probably necessary to elaborate measures that will be effective with limited personnel within the framework of not causing obstacles to the combat function which will be required in a crisis. Consequently, we should probably reduce the authorized strength of permanent self-defense personnel from the current level of approximately 270,400 to a target of about 240,000, including even those personnel who are necessary to functions which should be strengthened in the future. Within this limit, we must guarantee those personnel who are necessary to posts for the purpose of carrying out various missions. We should study the introduction of a new Self-Defense Forces reserve system so as to be able to supplement insufficient staff without delay in an emergency, but we will discuss that point later.
- (v) **Ground Defense Capability:** How the security environment which surrounds Japan may change, there will be no change in the fact that ground defense capability contributes to the stability of national life by having the mission of defense Japanese territory. Up to now we placed priority on preparing for an invasion of the Japanese main islands by a hostile force, and on concentrated operation of almost the total strength of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, and have dispersed divisions with uniform composition throughout Japan. In the future, we will reorganize them into multifunctional units, with the emphasis on being able to deal flexibly with such diverse missions as coping with various kinds of danger which could very possibly arise even if they do not reach this kind of full-scale invasion, UN peacekeeping operations, and domestic disaster relief and emergency assistance. That is, we should reduce the number and scale of units by implementing such things as disposition of units and reorganization toward divisions and brigades of diverse compositions which gives consideration to the special characteristics of the region.

In the Ground Self-Defense Force there is a wide gap between authorized strength and the actual situation and, because of this, there are strains in terms of unit maintenance and management: For example, large obstacles have appeared in education and training and in management of unit duties. In order to solve this problem, we should reduce unit scale and reorganize them into units perfected in terms of content. It is particularly essential to guarantee necessary personnel and to maintain a high degree of training in regard to sectors which have many opportunities to carry out missions in peacetime, and to posts from which a rapid-response capability is required. On the

other hand, we should study the introduction of a new system of reserve self-defense personnel in order to make it possible to respond promptly in time of emergency. The aim of this system would be to create reserve troop strength which is highly trained enough that it can be assigned to first-line units in a crisis, by recruiting reserve self-defense personnel from among retired self-defense personnel, and carrying out unit-level training for a considerable number of days each year. Furthermore, together with the establishment of this system, it will be necessary, through improvement in the treatment of reserve self-defense personnel, and through various policies, including fiscal measures directed toward corporations and so on, which are their employers, to create a system based on cooperation of government and the private sector by which reserve self-defense personnel will be able to participate in prescribed training.

Thus it is required that, besides reducing the number of personnel, we reorganize into a more perfect ground defense capability by contriving to promote conversion from an emphasis on such heavy equipment as tanks and guns to an emphasis on enhancement of mobility and high-tech equipment, and to enhance the specialized ability of the Self-Defense Forces personnel who will operate this equipment.

- (vi) **Maritime Defense Capability:** For Japan, which is surrounded by ocean on all sides, the defense of the surrounding waters and the guaranteeing of the safety of maritime transportation are indispensable for guaranteeing a foundation for survival, a capacity to sustain warfare, and a foundation for U.S. Forces coming to assist Japan. Not only that, guaranteeing the safety of maritime transportation in peacetime is a life-or-death problem for Japan, whose degree of dependence on supply of such things as energy and on trade in manufactured products is very high. Moreover, such things as rescue in disasters at sea, control of pirates, and control of narcotics are also missions with which the Maritime Self-Defense Force should grapple in cooperation with the Maritime Safety Agency.

It is probable that U.S. naval power, which enjoys overwhelming superiority, will continue for the foreseeable future as a basic element which maintains the safety of all the oceans in the world, including the Pacific Ocean. Japan's maritime defense capability will carry out the above-mentioned missions while maintaining the cooperative relationship with that kind of U.S. Navy.

The possibility of the kind of full-scale, destructive attack on maritime transportation by Soviet submarines which had been assumed up to now, has declined, so we should reduce the number of antisubmarine warfare and antimine warfare ships and aircraft. On the other hand, we should devote attention to preparing a more balanced maritime

defense capability. For example, it is necessary to perfect such things as the monitoring and patrol function and the surface-warfare and aerial-warfare capabilities more than heretofore. Furthermore, we probably should strengthen to a certain degree such support functions as maritime transport and resupply at sea, taking into consideration also participation in such things as UN peacekeeping operations.

Moreover, it is necessary to solve the present situation of partially incomplete ship's crews in order to enhance the degree of training and the rapid-response setup. In order to do that, we should probably devise such methods as allotting to it the necessary personnel who are produced as a result of the gradual reduction in the number of ships and so on mentioned above.

- (vii) **Air Defense Capability:** If we consider the advancement in aircraft and missile technology, the role which air defense capability plays in Japan's defense might increase in the future, but it will probably not decline. Modernization of Japan's air warning and control system further advanced by such things as having introduced AWACS [airborne warning and control system]. Considerable progress is expected in this area of technology, so a broad review should probably be carried out, including also the standpoint of making more efficient such air warning and control systems as radar sites. Furthermore, the possibility of the kind of full-fledged air attacks by the Soviet Union which were hypothesized up to now has decreased, so we should probably reduce the number of fighter aircraft and fighter squadrons (furthermore, it includes parts which transcend the concept of air defense up to now in regard to ballistic missile defense, so it will be treated later at a different place).

On the other hand, introduction of an airborne-fueling function is also probably worthy of study from the standpoint that it is helpful in strengthening the air defense system and making it more efficient. And it would also be possible to increase the efficiency of flight training by this. Furthermore, a long period of time is necessary to train pilots, so we probably should set aside money and energy to perfect their education and training.

And it is thought necessary, from the viewpoint of future participation in such things as UN peacekeeping operations, to maintain a certain long-range transport function in order to enhance aerial mobility.

- (viii) **Antiballistic Missile Systems:** In order to counter the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and their means of delivery, efforts are being made for control by various regimes, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The success of these long-term view based international efforts is, of course, extremely desirable from the standpoint of Japan's national interest in regard to security. Therefore, Japan, too, is playing an active role in building those international control systems. On the other hand, being equipped with effective means of defense against attacks and intimidation by such things as nuclear missiles during the transition period until that goal is achieved is an indispensable condition for the success of the above-mentioned proliferation-prevention regimes which are based on long-term goal. That is because the motive for proliferation will not disappear so long as there exist countries which are driven by insecurity. From this kind of viewpoint, it is absolutely necessary to Japan, which adopts a policy of no nuclear weapons, that the reliability of the U.S. deterrent be maintained. In addition, it is also necessary for Japan itself to possess a ballistic missile defense capability. In order to do that, we should grapple actively toward its possession while cooperating with the United States, whose research in this field is the most advanced. Furthermore, we should give particular attention to the fact that this kind of system will require a system of combined-unit operation because cooperation with U.S. Forces is indispensable.

Moreover, when introducing this kind of system it will probably be necessary to study an efficient air defense system, including taking another look at the allotment of roles among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.

- (ix) **Maintaining Flexibility in Defense Capability:** Even though there is no imminent danger today, we cannot tell what kind of situation may develop in the future, given the latent dangers in an opaque, uncertain security environment. In order to prepare for such situations and contribute also to the improvement of education and training, we must take into consideration the need have latitude in handling specialized personnel whose training is long (for example, commanders, pilots, and so on) and in handling equipment that requires a long lead time for acquisition (for example, aircraft and warships), using such methods as holding training well in advance and having a certain level of disposition to that sector. Introduction of a new system of reserve self-defense personnel as previously mentioned should also be studied in connection with this.

(x) Measures on the Personnel Aspect:

- (a) Improvement in the Treatment of Self-Defense Personnel. As is true of all organizations, the nucleus of a defense organization is also, ultimately, a question of people. In particular, missions must be executed by members of the Self-Defense Forces with high morale and ability in order to maintain the efficiency of the entire organization while reducing personnel. From that viewpoint, careful consideration is necessary regarding the treatment and living environment of Self-Defense Forces personnel from the time of recruitment until after retirement.
- (b) Improvement in Recruitment Methods. Because of the decline in the young population, one cannot expect that recruitment of self-defense personnel will become easier in the future than it has been heretofore. Considering that point, the following kinds of improvements in recruiting methods are desirable. First, following the example of general public-service staff and of private-sector enterprises, we should revise recruitment methods toward using as much as possible the cooperation of schools and local governments, and recruit candidates for the Self-Defense Forces through those institutions. Second, taking into consideration such factors as fluctuation in business conditions, we should consider such things as introducing an employment method that is not bound by the authorized number for a single fiscal year, but can control the number of persons recruited across several fiscal years.
- (c) Cultivation of Capable Staff and Improvement in the Content of Education and Training. In view of the trend for the missions handled with defense capability to become more international and more diverse, improvements must be made in the content of education and training for the purpose of cultivating the necessary capable staff. This begins first with securing adaptable capable staff at the recruitment stage, but the role fulfilled by education and training after hiring is also very great. What should be given particular emphasis in the future is the viewpoint of cultivating the kind of capable staff who have knowledge and sense concerning such things as linguistics and international relations, who will be able to fully satisfy such international cooperation as participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

- (xi) Consolidation and Distribution of Positions: In addition to the standpoint of defense and guarding, the present disposition of positions was determined by considering the following kind of points. That is, great disasters as typified by the Isewan typhoon of 1959 and the tremendous snowfall in the Hokuriku District in 1963 occurred frequently in the period directly following establishment of the Self-Defense

Forces, so dispatch to disaster areas was emphasized as a Self-Defense Forces mission. The necessity to meet this kind of demand of local communities was an important factor.

Today, considering both rationalization and increased efficiency of defense capability and the point that the ability of local governments to respond to disasters has improved greatly in the last 20 or 30 years, it has become a time when it is best to take another look at the unit disposition of the Self-Defense Forces. For example, a certain amount of retrenchment is probably permissible in regard to small-scale Ground Self-Defense Force posts, taking into consideration the social needs of the locality in question and within a scope which will not markedly affect them. However, it is necessary to take measures that will make restoration possible for places with a high probability of becoming necessary for national defense in the event of an emergency.

From the viewpoint of increasing the efficiency of defense capability as a whole, it is desirable to promote consolidation and elimination of positions by applying the resources freed up by eliminating some positions to completing the preparation of positions that can be integrated. Special measures on the fiscal side will probably be necessary in order to make possible this kind of smooth consolidation and elimination.

Furthermore, even when it is possible to increase efficiency by consolidation and elimination, maintaining positions will require considerable personnel and expenditures. In general, we probably should devise ways to entrust the business of this kind of position and so on to the private sector, in so far as possible, in order to ease pressure on disposition of personnel and allotment of resources to other sectors.

Section 4. Other Matters Connected With Defense

This report takes up mainly the problem of what defense capability improvements are necessary in conformity with the new international situation and security environment. But, as we have also emphasized before, defense can fulfill its role only when accurately assigned a position in a comprehensive system of security policy. In that sense, defense improvement is one part of assigning a new direction to security policy as a whole. Consequently, we want to take up last, from among the tasks that are intimately involved in the desired reorganization of defense capability, items which should be taken up by the entire government or by Japanese society as a whole. (We also want to add here that many problems which are difficult to solve without efforts by the nation as a whole, which transcend the level of the Defense Agency—introduction of a new system of reserve self-defense personnel, for example—are also contained in what has been mentioned in the three previous sections.)

1. Perfection of Security-Related Research and Education

In Japan there has been the tendency until now not to give sufficient attention to security-related research and education. If we consider the fact that we are in an international environment in which the nation and the people should have a serious interest in peace, that must be reflected in research and education on security problems.

In its present state, security-related education is extremely inadequate. Conducting appropriate security education at each level from elementary to advanced education is important to the future security of Japan. Security is a public good enjoyed equally by all Japanese, so both national defense and security will probably lose their spiritual foundation if society as a whole neglects to give suitable respect to the people who engage in this duty. There is no example of such a nation maintaining prosperity. Consequently, it is probably essential to give consideration that members of the Self-Defense Forces should be able to carry out their duties with pride and satisfaction.

2. The Defense Industry

The total production of today's Japanese defense industry accounts for only about 0.6 percent of domestic industrial production, so it is certainly not large if viewed from the standpoint of the national economy. But we would like to emphasize here that it is extremely important to have within Japan a defense industry which can develop and manufacture equipment that is technically advanced and of high quality. The role played by the prewar army arsenals and naval arsenals is carried out in the postwar era completely by the private-sector defense industry. The special characteristic of this industry is that the companies related to it are spread widely across every industrial sector, and that, moreover, they include even a very large number of small and medium enterprises and highly specialized enterprises. Japan has a policy of strict self-control of arms exports based on the three principles of export of arms, so the arms-related departments of such private-sector enterprises can only establish production plans for Defense Agency orders. Therefore, there is a tendency for it to become custom production and for products to become comparatively expensive in general. Moreover, with major weapons the main force is importation from the United States and licensed production of U.S. equipment, so it has the special characteristic of being strongly influenced by U.S. equipment.

Though under these kinds of restrictions, until recently defense capability was at the stage of preparation and construction, so Japan's defense industry maintained its production base. But in the last two or three years the budget for weapons procurement has begun to level off or decline, so the future has become uncertain. Because of the recession just at that time, profits of all enterprises have declined, so maintaining the defense sector has gradually become more difficult.

As also stated previously, in the future the task will be to reduce and make more efficient the scale of defense capability as a whole, centered on combat units, while promoting modernization of defense capability. In addition, if we consider at the same time such facts as that there is a trend for the life expectancy of equipment to also grow markedly, a rather large reduction in quantity is expected in procurement of equipment, particularly frontline equipment, compared with the present. The result is that, unless suitable measures are devised to deal with this, it will become difficult in a number of corporations to maintain their production base, and in the worst case, they may be driven to a point where they cannot help withdrawing from the defense industry.

Because of the reasons explained above, Japan's defense production has unfavorable conditions in terms of cost. However, it will not do to judge the propriety of everything about the nature of the defense industry from the standpoint of economy alone. Maintaining independence and self-reliance in equipment procurement and defense-related technology is also vital for the purpose of promoting technology exchange with the United States. Therefore, we will require the kind of policy considerations that assist to the utmost the survival of enterprises which participate in the defense industry.

For example, it is desirable that the government make planning easy for the private sector by disclosing the outlook for medium-term procurement with as great a time margin as possible. In particular, along with giving continuous thought to conversion of domestic production and promoting restructuring at the enterprise level, it is necessary to give attention to the following kind of points in order to alleviate as much as possible the disadvantageous effects of reducing the volume of frontline equipment. First, it is necessary to consider maintaining a base for research and development and production technology in sectors that require advanced technology. Second, it is absolutely necessary that related enterprises maintain the ability to repair equipment, so as not to produce impediments to the daily operation of equipment at the unit job site. Third, it will probably be necessary to give consideration to small and medium enterprises which depend heavily on defense demand, from the viewpoint of industrial or social policy. Fourth, we should probably study promotion of joint research and development and joint production with such countries as the United States as one measure to deal with this.

3. Technological Base

It is expected that military technology will continue to progress steadily in the future as well. Moreover, it will be impossible to make up for lagging quality through quantity, so maintaining the level of the newest defense technology is very important for security. On the other hand, because it is expected that, as stated above, the quantity of frontline equipment procured will decline in the future, even if a company succeeds in research and

development at great pains, the actual amount of equipment ordered may not be as much as expected. There is fear that the fact that it is impossible to estimate future orders will invite a decline in private-sector enterprises' desire to invest in research and development.

Considering this point, it is vital that in the future the government aim at strengthening the base for the most leading-edge technology by pouring effort into research and development and by promoting positive research on technologies that are not predicated on changing to mass production by government funds. And it is also important to devote effort to such activities as accumulation of software and the building of data bases.

4. The Proper Nature of Future Plans for Improving Defense Capability

Implementing a reorganization of defensive capability and organizational reform in line with the kind of thinking upon which this report is predicated will also affect in many ways related local governments and society in general, such as private enterprises, and of course, members of the Self-Defense Forces and persons related to the Defense Agency; therefore it will probably be necessary to implement it in stages, spending a suitable period of time (for example, making the target about 10 years) in order to avoid unnecessary disruption. Furthermore, the reform plan that we are proposing here is something of the nature of presenting future goals which should be reached in the course of reforms which are carried out over a suitable period of time; it is not something which, like the attached table of the "National Defense Program Outline," indicates such things as goals which should be maintained over the long term or the upper limit of defense capability. We must say goodbye to the "National Defense Program Outline," but whether it is necessary to draw up some other document to replace it is a question which government should study in the future. Furthermore, whether we should also rewrite the "Basic Policy for National Defense" into a document that expresses the basic thinking on a new defense is probably a task for future study.

In addition, we probably should draw up a medium-term plan on concrete preparation of defense capability and advance in a flexible and systematic manner on that basis.

5. Establishment of a Crisis-Management System and Centralization of Intelligence:

It has been pointed out that, in general, the multiple junctures between organization and organization are the weakest point in C3I systems, and that it is there that defects are easily revealed. It appears that this observation is valid, as it stands, for the current state of the crisis-management system and Japan's intelligence system for the nation as a whole. In the cabinet, efforts have been made to fill in these junctures, such as holding joint intelligence meetings, but it is necessary to strive in such a way that the intelligence and crisis-management

systems of the government as a whole will function more effectively. In the future it will be necessary to grapple in earnest with the task of further strengthening and perfecting the crisis-management and intelligence-analysis functions at the cabinet level. This task is an extremely important problem which covers a wide range, from cultivating intelligence specialists and improving their treatment, to such matters as strengthening the intelligence function at the level of the Self-Defense Forces and all government agencies, centralizing intelligence at the cabinet level and devising a policy-decision system suitable for crisis management, and preparing a system of domestic law which is prepared for an emergency situation, so we hope that a full debate will be carried out.

In Closing

The cold war ended, and certain changes occurred in the nature of the problem of security. In this kind of situation, the peoples of the world began their respective efforts, seeking a new world order. It is necessary, for us Japanese also, to refresh our hearts and grapple with security policy.

Of course, there is no change in the fact that the foundation of security policy resides in each country's capacity for self-management and for meeting emergencies. Nor is there any change in the fact that commonality of interests and sense of values is the most certain bond in relations between countries. In that sense, the bond between Japan and the United States, which possess common goals in regard to the formation of a new international order, will probably increase in importance even more than ever. Because it is thought that, in the future, opportunities will increase for the peoples of the world to unite and act constructively and to actively attempt to prevent armed conflicts and resolve them at an early stage, and also to solve such social problems as poverty, which become a cause of conflict. Through steadily piling up positive achievements of this kind of cooperative security, humanity will, to that extent, draw nearer to the goal of collective security which is hoisted aloft by the United Nations. The result will probably be that an international order which takes as its basic rule prohibition of "the threat or use of force as means for solving international disputes" will become more certain. For that to happen would also serve the interests of the Japanese people, so we Japanese should probably exert maximum effort with that as the goal.

This report has discussed the proper nature of the defense capability and security policy which Japan should adopt in the future based on that kind of viewpoint. The three pillars are: promotion of multilateral security, perfection of the Japan-U.S. security relationship and maintenance of an efficient and highly reliable defense capability.

In order for the kind of new security policy which we have described here to be implemented smoothly, and for it to become possible for defense to play a significant

role within that, it is absolutely necessary for the entire nation to grapple with it from a comprehensive viewpoint, and conduct coherent management of policy. Formation of a crisis-management system which makes possible effective determination and implementation of policy is essential to that. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that broad understanding, support and participation of all Japanese is the foundation of security policy. We shall be happy if the report of this council contributes to increasing national understanding in connection with the problem of security.

References

Membership of the Defense Issues Council [Boei Mondai Kondankai]

- Hirotaro Higuchi (chairman), chairman, Asahi Breweries Ltd.
- Ken Moroi (deputy chairman), chairman, Chichibu Cement Co., Ltd.
- Kuniko Inoguchi (member), professor, Sophia University
- Yoshio Okawara (member), special adviser, Keidanren
- Toyoo Gyoten (member), chairman, The Bank of Tokyo
- Hajime Sakuma (member), special consultant, NTT
- Seiki Nishihiro (member), adviser, Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.
- Shinji Fukukawa (member), deputy chairman, Kobe Steel Ltd.
- Akio Watanabe (member), professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

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Recognition of the international situation
The military situation surrounding Japan
- Third Meeting (16 March)
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- Fourth Meeting (30 March)
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- Fifth Meeting (6 April)
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Study of the system of laws dealing with emergencies
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industry

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- 11th Meeting (25 May)
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- 13th Meeting (8 June)
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- 14th Meeting (13 June)
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- 16th Meeting (27 June)
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- 18th Meeting (20 July)
Debate for the purpose of reaching a consensus

- 19th Meeting (27 July)
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- 20th Meeting (12 August)
Report presented to Prime Minister Murayama

Articles Critique Defense Issues Council Report

Military Commentator Disputes Reasoning

942A0722A Tokyo EKONOMISUTO in Japanese
30 Aug 94 pp 66-69

[Article by Haruo Fujii, military commentator: "The Goal Is To Make the Self-Defense Forces the Military Force of a 'Normal Nation'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Defense Issues Council [Boei Mondai Kondankai], a personal advisory organ of the prime minister, has submitted its report. In summary, the report seeks a qualitative conversion of the Self-Defense Forces [SDF] into a military force characteristic of a "normal nation."*

A Blow From Behind for Prime Minister Murayama

The Defense Issues Council, which was established and operated for Prime Ministers Hosokawa, Hata, and Murayama for the purpose of recommending "ideas for a framework to guide replacement of the National Defense Program Outline," submitted its report to Prime Minister Murayama on 12 August.

The contents of the report are diametrically opposite to the military disarmament preferences embraced by Prime Minister Hosokawa when he established the advisory group. The report seeks reinforcement, improvement, and expansion of the SDF over a span of about 10 years. Moreover, the report denies all of the fruits of pacifism of postwar Japan applauded by Prime Minister Murayama and seeks a qualitative conversion of security policies and the SDF.

Prime Minister Murayama—who announced a reversal of a policy basic to the SDPJ since its founding less than a month after his assumption of office and who decided to embrace the Japan-U.S. security system and the constitutionality of the SDF—was dealt a surprise by none other than his own personal advisory organ.

Both Prime Minister Murayama's Diet interpellations, which recognized the constitutionality of the SDF, and the new SDPJ policies scheduled for approval during the party's special meeting in September in response to the prime minister's Diet statements can be interpreted as having been developed under several premises.

During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on 20 July, Prime Minister Murayama mentioned that the SDPJ in the postwar era has assiduously strived to materialize the spirit of the pacifist constitution, and he mentioned the establishment of basic rules of civilian

control, dedication to defense, ban on overseas deployment, ban on collective defense actions, three principles against nuclear weapons, and prohibition of weapons exports.

Further, in his general-policy speech before the Diet, he stressed, "Now that the days of East-West confrontation based on massive military forces has ended, it is time for our nation to make additional contributions to the elimination of mutual distrust among nations and poverty which are the root cause of disputes."

He has also referred to the new SDPJ draft policy which calls for debate on security policies with the concurrence of the public in view of the elimination of the danger of unrestrained military expansion because of the end to the cold war.

We cannot deny the fact that the basis for debating future security policy should be the public's pacifist activities over the 50-year postwar period. Those activities were of historical significance and opened a new page in the history of mankind, as can be seen in the global spread of movements calling for a ban on atomic and hydrogen bombs and the rejection of nuclear war.

When one considers that Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano of the Hata cabinet and Environmental Agency Director General Shin Sakurai of the Murayama cabinet were both forced to resign because of statements justifying Japan's wars of aggression, it can be seen that constitutional pacifism is being sustained and developed, not by government and politicians, but by the public.

As we welcome the historical turning point signaled by the end of the East-West cold war, the question is how we should nurture this pacifism. How will pacifism be linked with the basic policy conversion of Prime Minister Murayama and the SDPJ Central Committee? At the present time, the answers are totally indiscernible.

Although it is trying to be a pacifist administration, the vulnerable point of the Murayama cabinet is that it has yet to clearly define its complete concept on security policy. The Defense Issues Council report took advantage of that weakness.

Prime Minister Hosokawa established the Defense Issues Council in February of this year in response to the dramatic change in the international situation signaled by the end of the cold war, for the purpose of pursuing ways for Japan to lead the world in pacifism and disarmament. The Defense Issues Council produced the report in response to this crucial and difficult request for advice in a mere five months. The reason for such an achievement was that the study was performed by a group of defense bureaucrats under the supervision of SDF uniformed personnel.

Principal Duties Encompass Use of Military Force in Overseas Areas

A major principle of the SDF since its inception is that it will not deploy overseas for the purpose of using military force. The viewpoint of the administrations over the years has been that the Constitution prohibited not only so-called deployment of troops overseas, but participation in "UN Forces" missions which involved the use of military force. However, the council report seeks to abolish such restrictions, which are predicated on pacifism as stipulated in the Constitution.

Along with its mission of defending Japan based on the right to individual self-defense, the report treats "as an important mission of the SDF, its participation in a variety of multifaceted cooperative efforts under the framework of the UN for the purpose of international security," seeks legislative action to add peacekeeping operations (PKO) as a main mission of the SDF, and asserts that use of weapons within a specified scope "should be sanctioned."

Additionally, the report recommends the establishment of a system that makes it appropriate for the SDF to become involved in international security, including actions such as canceling the freeze precluding SDF peacekeeping forces (PKF) from engaging in their inherent missions, adopting UN criteria for the use of weapons, using SDF installations for PKO training and as advance staging areas for materiel and equipment, accumulating and maintaining information on international cooperation, and administering specialized training of personnel.

The question is, where will we find the constitutional basis for such important new SDF missions, including the use of military force? In this respect, Chapter 2 of the report refers to the United Nations as a collective security organization and references the UN Charter's provisions concerning the ban on the use of military force and expresses the view that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution "is consistent in spirit with the UN Charter." According to the 12 August edition of SANGYO KEIZAI SHIMBUN, the cabinet Legislative Bureau strongly objected to such views, but the advisory council insisted on expressing its position in the report.

The report combines Article 9 of the Constitution and the UN Charter to repudiate the unique definition of Article 9 and to seek a means for the SDF to participate in all collective security actions to include those sponsored by the United Nations. This is a case of interpreting Japan's Constitution as a "normal constitution." By so doing, the SDF becomes the military force of a "normal nation."

In this respect, the report not only advocates the aggressive participation of the SDF in "very diverse" PKO's, but it states in Chapter 1, "The maintenance of multilateral cooperation centered on the United States is

indispensable for the UN security mechanism to function," and even went so far as to refer to the establishment of a legal framework permitting participation in multinational military actions. Additionally, Chapter 3, under the heading of "The Proper Nature of Defense Capability in a New Era," uses at the beginning of the chapter the catchphrase, "From a Cold War Defense Strategy to a Multilateral Security Strategy."

The argument which seeks to expand the interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution and constitutionalize the use of military force based on the UN charter was the first recommendation made by the Constitutional Research Committee, organized by the YOMIURI SHIMBUN in December 1992. Two members of that committee participating as members of the Defense Issues Council included Ken Moroi (acting chairman and chairman of Chichibu Cement) and Masateru Nishihiro (former Defense Agency administrative vice minister).

The report haphazardly uses terms such as multilateral collective security, international security, and cooperative security, but the individual terms are not clearly defined. The term international security was proposed in February 1993 in the LDP report by the "Research Committee on Japan's Role in the International Community" chaired by Ichiro Ozawa, and we can assume that it is used in the same sense in the Defense Issues Council report.

With respect to the concept of allowing the SDF to participate in international security actions, the Defense Issues Council report and the Ozawa Research Committee report are alarmingly similar. In fact, the May 10-17 edition of SEKAI SHUHO reported that Defense Issues Council's "core members, including Nishihiro, have been in contact with Shinseito Secretary General Ozawa."

If the Defense Issues Council report had been completed when Prime Minister Hata was in office, it would have been welcomed with open arms, but the submission of a hawkish report to a dovish prime minister was bad timing. According to the 13 August edition of MAINICHI, Nishi is quoted as saying, "We never considered the character of the administration" in working on the Defense Issues Council report.

Report Lists Military Expansion Projects

The Defense Agency, which sensed a crisis because of Prime Minister Hosokawa's disarmament ambitions, immediately following the launching of the Defense Issues Council, on 1 March, established the "Committee To Study Appropriate Defense Capabilities" [Boeiryoku no Arikata Kento Kaiji] chaired by Director General Aichi, with official membership composed of vice ministers, the director general of the Defense Policy Bureau, Joint Staff Council chairman, chiefs of staff of the respective services, and others, and launched an agency-wide research project.

Chapter 3 occupies more than 60 percent of the overall report, but its contents can be said to be a lock, stock, and barrel adaptation of the Defense Agency's future defense capabilities plan. Projects which are normally incorporated in the budget request process such as procurement of new equipment and organizational changes were covered in the report as if such action represented a rare opportunity.

One wonders why the prime minister's advisory organ must make an assessment of individual SDF projects. Many of the nine members are not employees of the Defense Agency. You could say that the actions taken by the Defense Issues Council reflect an irresponsible stance on the part of such members. Supposedly, the Defense Issues Council was established to produce a report providing for a broader perspective of the defense issue. Notwithstanding, the report was compiled so as to indiscriminately incorporate across-the-board buildup requests of the Defense Agency.

Practically no substantive proposals were made for the reduction of defense capabilities. The report proposes an SDF authorized personnel reduction from 274,000 to 240,000. However, the current strength of 239,000 means that those figures do not represent a reduction in personnel. Since budgeted personnel strength equals current strength, a cut in statutory authorized personnel will not lead to a reduction in defense spending.

The Ground Self-Defense Force [GSDF] will reduce the statutory ceiling for combat units to eliminate its chronic shortage of personnel and reorganize itself into high-tech multifunctional units. The change will enable rapid deployment on a fully manned unit basis. Additionally, the GSDF will adopt a new system for maintaining highly trained reservists to substitute for the reduced active forces ceiling. In other words, the report calls for both human and material reinforcements and improvements.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF] will reduce its antisubmarine and antimine forces in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but its peacetime missions will be expanded to include the maintenance of safe passage of the seas and control of pirates and drug traffic. Such proposals involve the conversion of the MSDF to a navy under international law and its assignment to peacetime maritime patrol actions.

Such proposed changes will enable the MSDF to engage in the apprehension of pirates, pursuit of illegal vessels, escort of Japanese vessels, and the use of force in ordering vessels to stop for inspections under international law. Such measures will enable preparations for maritime blockades enforced in connection with economic sanctions. Such actions will require amendment of the SDF Law. Current maritime patrol actions under Section 82 of the SDF Law are limited to domestic police actions as prescribed for the maritime patrol units and the policing of Japanese vessels on the open seas. Moreover, such authority can be exercised only when orders

are issued by the director general of the Defense Agency with the approval of the prime minister.

The Defense Issues Council report provides that the MSDF should improve its surveillance and patrol capabilities as well as its surface combat and air defense capabilities, reinforce its marine transport and high-seas resupply capabilities for use during overseas deployments, and exert efforts to build a balanced maritime defense capability.

The Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF] will review its need for radar sites in connection with its purchase of AWACS [airborne warning and control system] and cut the number of fighter planes in response to the reduced threat of Soviet air incursions. On the other hand, it will have to maintain capabilities for in-flight refueling of aircraft and long-range transport.

The report advises aggressive action to maintain antiballistic missile systems as replacements for fighter planes. The cost of such systems runs into the trillion yen range. Additionally, the report lists many items requiring reinforcement and improvement actions, such as enhancement of strategic intelligence and analytical capabilities using reconnaissance satellites, and the reinforcement of joint operational capabilities of the land, sea, and air services through expansion of Joint Chiefs of Staff authority and personnel strength.

Direct operating costs of reconnaissance satellites and accompanying intelligence processing costs are very expensive. Reportedly, the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office], which is in charge of U.S. reconnaissance satellites, is a high-level secret organization whose budget is spread throughout the defense agencies and is three times that of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In summary, the Defense Issues Council makes a sweeping attempt to expand the missions, authority, organization, and budget of the SDF. Proposals to implement joint production of defense equipment with the United States will probably require abolishment of the principle banning export of weapons. It will take government decisions and guidance to extricate ourselves from almost 50 years of cold war mentality and military expansion inertia.

Chapter 3 of the defense white paper for this year released on 15 July was revised to cover "responses to changes in the SDF" and refers, not only to international contributions of the past, but also to the status of defense capabilities in connection with the dismantling of the Soviet Union. However, the chapter did not contain anything of substance. The writers probably left the chapter open for coverage by the Defense Issues Council report. The mass media used far more space covering the Defense Issues Council report than covering the defense white paper.

Need for Significant Disarmament

The situational perception outlined in Chapter 1 of the Defense Issues Council report lacks persuasiveness. As an example, it concludes that "the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Asian-Pacific region did not signal a dramatic change in the security scenario. There is no evidence that that change brought a sharp decline in the level of military tensions," but is that really the case? There are many ways in which one can substantiate a dramatic environmental change for Japan because of the Soviet collapse. The Japanese public has a keen sense of "the fact that the level of military tensions has declined sharply."

Even the defense white paper recognizes that the end to the East-West cold war has "reduced the potential for an outbreak of a global war." However, the white paper states the subsequent situation is obscure, unstable, uncertain, and fluid. The Defense Issues Council report provides the same perception. However, using such rationale to justify reinforcements and improvements in defense capabilities is a case of excessive promotion of one's own interests.

Experience has already demonstrated that military force is almost entirely impotent as a solution to frequently occurring regional disputes. The root causes of regional disputes are nonmilitary threats such as hunger and poverty, differences between the haves and have nots, environmental destruction, and deterioration of medical and educational services, and military measures are useless in solving such problems.

The report rejects organizations other than the SDF for PKO as being "useless." However, isn't it a case where lack of substitutability of SDF units exists only in those cases where use of military force (combat actions) is the objective? If we are speaking of nonmilitary international contributions, an organization other than the SDF would be most qualified. Such organizations could also maintain self-sustaining capabilities in the area of transportation and supply.

It would be irrational to respond to missiles produced three generations back with expensive countermeasures such as theater missile defense (TMD) systems or to use reconnaissance satellites for regional disputes and crime investigations. There are many effective nonmilitary measures. I propose that defense spending be cut significantly by more than 1 trillion yen for the near term and that those funds be used in establishing a record of international contributions of a visible nature.

[Boxed item: *Haruo Fujii: Military commentator. Born 1928. Dropped out of Yamaguchi Business College. Established the Military Issues Research Association, engaging in private-sector liberal movements including the publication of GUNJIMINRON [Civilian Commentary on Military Affairs]. Books authored include Japan's National Secrets.*]

NRI Researcher Questions Report's Logic

942A0721A Tokyo EKONOMISUTO in Japanese
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[Article by Satoshi Morimoto, chief researcher, Nomura Research Institute: "What Japanese Interests Are Protected by Its Defense Capabilities?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In carrying on a discussion about appropriate defense capabilities, it is logical to examine what Japanese interests are to be protected, what threats exist to Japanese interests, and what defense capabilities we need in order to cope with the threats. We cannot find this logic in the report by the Defense Issues Council [Boei Mondai Kondankai].*

When we take a look at a globe, we will see that Japan is one of the few countries located between the United States and Russia. With such a location, our country was placed in the middle of a fierce military confrontation between the East and West camps led by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively during the cold war era.

Under these circumstances, however, our country was able to fully ensure its national security in the cold war era only because it assumed a part in the U.S. Soviet-containment policy in Asia on the basis of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. That is, during the cold war era, our country sought to attain its defense goal as a result of containing the former Soviet Union through joint efforts with the United States. And this method proved successful.

On the other hand, concerning the buildup of defense capabilities, it kept promoting the buildup on the basis of the present National Defense Program Outline [NDPO] decided in 1976 (the 51st year of Showa). As is widely said, this NDPO is founded on an idea called the Basic Defense Concept.

This concept calls for building defense capabilities that meet Japan's minimum defense requirements without naming any specific threat against Japan; therefore, without saying so, our defense capabilities are designed to cope with the former Soviet Union's military threat. It was thus a defense concept based on, so to speak, a "departure from threat-oriented theory." Japan could not but use such an explanation under the political situation in those days.

In reality, however, toward the end of the 1970's, particularly in the Far East, the threat of the former Soviet Union became conspicuous through its deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles, Backfire bombers, Kiev-class carriers, assault ships of the Ivan Rogov class, and Delta-class nuclear submarines.

In this context, though its defense buildup was based on a "departure from threat-oriented theory," Japan moved in effect toward introducing individual weapons systems, explaining the need to cope with such a real threat

from the former Soviet Union. It was against this background that Japan was able to equip itself with the newest weapons such as F-15 fighters, P-3C antisubmarine planes, Aegis ships, and E-2C's.

This was a great logical contradiction and represented a Japanese-style double standard.

At any rate, Japan thus kept promoting its defense buildup, and late in 1990 when the current Midterm Defense Buildup Plan (fiscal 1991-1995) was decided, it reached a situation in which the present NDPO-set defense capability levels were achieved in general.

Therefore, properly speaking, the present NDPO should have been reviewed for a change at the end of 1990. However, the Defense Agency kept putting off this NDPO review work. Thus, it is now become compelled to review the present NDPO for a change by the end of fiscal 1995 when the current Midterm Defense Buildup Plan period ends.

In the summer of 1993, the Defense Agency had already set up a research team privately and began studies to work out a new program outline with an eye to the post-cold war situation. Further, in the beginning of 1994, the Defense Agency inaugurated a formal research team led by Administrative Vice Minister Hatakeyama within the agency and began actual work.

On the other hand, an idea emerged within the government that an advisory council should be formed by intellectuals to study the way new national defense should be, with the upcoming review for changes in the program outline in mind. This is the "Defense Issues Council," an advisory panel to (then) Prime Minister Hosokawa, which was formed in February 1994.

Then, the office of prime minister changed from Hosokawa to Hata and from Hata to Murayama, but the advisory panel was left intact and turned over to each successor. Among members of the panel, a particularly important role has been played by Aoyama Gakuin University Professor Akio Watanabe and former Defense Agency Administrative Vice Minister Seiki Nishihiro (adviser to Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co.).

This Defense Issues Council began drafting a report after being briefed by concerned ministries and agencies on actual conditions related to defense issues. It then finished the examination process in six months as initially targeted and submitted its report to the prime minister on 12 August.

The work of reviewing the NDPO for changes within the Defense Agency is, in a strict sense, an inside job of the government. On the other hand, the purpose of the Defense Issues Council is to give counsel on "the way national defense should be," so its work was not to review the program outline for changes.

Division of Views on Threats

Now, the work within the Defense Agency, including that conducted by Vice Minister Hatakeyama and others, faced a large obstacle from the outset. It was because the views on threats and on the role of national defense based on those threats were widely divided within the agency.

Uniformed officers felt that a nation's defense should be considered on the basis of the opponent's capabilities and that Russia was still a country that could pose a threat to Japan. In contrast, civilian officials thought that the Russia threat had now disappeared and that the dangers in the post-cold war era were rather unstable conditions, which assume broad and complicated aspects. These two views stood in opposition to each other.

This difference of views was also reflected in the role of national defense.

The former insisted that, therefore, the primary mission of defense capabilities continuously lay in the very ability to deter and cope with threats, while the latter maintained that the ideal form of new defense capabilities lay in the very wide-ranging faculty for coping with unstable conditions in international and regional communities, particularly in the faculty for coping with crises—for example, the competence to contribute to PKO [peacekeeping operations] and regional stability.

It may be said that the two sides could not easily give way on this point because they knew that this difference in thinking and in point of view would affect decisions on qualities and quantities of defense weapon systems to be developed in the future.

Now, as to the Defense Issues Council report, Professor Watanabe made a draft on the analysis of the situation and Japan's security policies in the first half of the report, while bureaus within the Defense Agency drew up the latter half of the report on the ideal form of national defense capabilities in such a manner as to comply with former Vice Minister Nishihiro's intentions. Accordingly, the latter half of the report turned out to largely reflect the views of civilian officials in the Defense Agency.

In a nutshell, the main points of the report are: the post-cold war security should be sought in "cooperative security"; in order to make the policy for this purpose an "active and constructive" one, Japan should promote "multilateral security cooperation"; and in the role of defense capabilities, stress should be laid on the "competence for crisis management and handling."

In any case, the arguments within the Defense Agency as to the threats and the role of national defense were settled by the report for the time being in the form of adopting the views held by civilian officials.

With this report providing momentum for its future operations, the Defense Agency needs to speedily round

off its internal work and formulate new guidelines (which are unlikely to become a new program outline, but in any case provide some guiding principles substituting for the present program outline) to present it to the Security Council for debate.

Moreover, on the basis of the guideline, the agency needs to work out an implementation plan, lay out the first Midterm Defense Buildup Plan by about July 1995, and make a budget request for fiscal 1996.

It is supposed that the Defense Issues Council, in fact, did not feel like submitting the report to Prime Minister Murayama, who was also chairman of the SDPJ. However, the Defense Issues Council could not bind its busy members to its work any longer. Also, in order to let the Defense Agency push ahead with its internal work, the Defense Issues Council could not further put off the presentation of the report. These were the circumstances.

What is more, to have the report accepted by Prime Minister Murayama, the Defense Issues Council had to change the substance of the report at the last stage in consideration of the SDPJ's position. At any rate, it remains to be seen in what manner the government and the ruling parties will accept the recent report and what points in the report they will practically adopt.

Report Keeping Cold-War Era Substance Intact

For the part of us, the people, it is necessary to give full thought and devote broad discussions to the following points at issue which this report has.

First, with regard to the post-cold war threats, this report says that a global military confrontation is unthinkable and that the threats have disappeared. It then cites the following factors as expected dangers in the future: 1) a lack of cooperation among major powers, with the United States as the center; 2) outbreaks of regional disputes; 3) proliferation of weapons and technology; and 4) the loss of ruling capabilities by nations.

Referring to Russia, the report simply says that, "as a maritime power, it has a strong interest in the Northwest Pacific," and not a single line in the report mentions that Russia can be a threat.

Is such a perception warranted?

The threats to Japan are, first, the situation on the Korean peninsula including the issue of North Korea's nuclear development, and second, Russia. Further, referring to the future, China can be a threat.

As long as the report fails to hold a right view as to the perception of the threats, we cannot help but think that the role and the ideal form of national defense mentioned in the report will lack persuasiveness.

The next point at issue is, under such a perception, what view the report has about to the role of defense capabilities.

In short, the report seeks to find the role of Japan's defense capabilities in its ability for crisis management with an eye to the stability of international society and the Asia-Pacific region and their surrounding circumstances. To this end, the report stresses that Japan should promote security cooperation with other countries and strengthen its peacekeeping operations.

However, a nation's defense capabilities, in a strict sense, should be those that can deter and beat off aggression and encroachments on national interests. We should say that the main points in this report lose sight of this original purpose.

With such a role and function, it is unlikely that Japan can cope with Russia and the "increased military capabilities of surrounding Asian countries since the end of the cold war."

Moreover, it is also a bit strange to seek Japan's defense capabilities through the Basic Defense Concept.

In addition, in its explanation of the Basic Defense Concept, the report notes that the present NDPO "presupposes U.S. military capabilities which deter the foe's invasion of Japan and also beat it off if the invasion actually takes place." It says that "Japan's defense capabilities have remained moderate in scale and nature on the basis of a presupposed strategic concept" that "military forces of Japan and the United States which are in mutually supplementary relations will cope with Soviet invasion as one body."

This is totally different in tone from the explanation which the government has given thus far regarding the Basic Defense Concept. Rather, this explanation represents the very position which the government had in mind but was unwilling to express openly when discussing defense during the cold war era.

Making such an explanation, the report stresses the need to maintain the Basic Defense Concept in the future as well; however, we must say that this amounts to heaping up logical contradictions. Rather, it is right to say that "we need to drastically alter the Basic Defense Concept to fit in with the present era" as Vice Minister Hatakeyama has mentioned in his lectures on various occasions.

In any case, Prime Minister Murayama and the SDPJ will eventually accept this report. It was a matter of course for Prime Minister Murayama to take a step to recognize the SDF [Self-Defense Forces] as constitutional; however, if he thinks about pushing ahead with SDF reductions merely for the sake of making the SDF constitutional, it will only endanger the security of Japan.

It is very questionable whether we are permitted to turn our defense capabilities, which were built through the use of the people's taxes, into something like the Peace Corps.

Next, stressing the role of the United States, the report repeatedly emphasizes that Japan-U.S. cooperation is more important than anything else to Japan's security.

As a matter of fact, in the course of studies by the Defense Issues Council and within the Defense Agency, there was utterly no difference of views as to the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation.

Nevertheless, the significance of the Japan-U.S. security system has clearly been undergoing a qualitative change since the end of the cold war.

It is a self-evident truth that the Japan-U.S. security system is important in the post-cold war era as well. The question is in what fields the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship based on this Japan-U.S. security system should be promoted and what kinds of cooperation should be carried out. In other words, the question is what explanation should be given in attaching significance to the post-cold war Japan-U.S. security system. It is regrettable that the report fails to make any reference to this point.

Look at National Interests and Threats to Them

Next, the report repeatedly stresses the need to positively participate in and cooperate with the UN peacekeeping activities and points out that, to this end, Japan should improve necessary systems and capabilities.

The report deserves praise in this respect in terms of general consideration; however, as to the rule of a freeze on the PKF [peacekeeping forces], the report slips up by only pointing out that "it is desirable to reduce the arguments to something that will lead to the lifting of the freeze as soon as possible." Moreover, it avoids referring to legislative issues arising in the course of promoting peacekeeping activities. All this clearly stems from consideration for Prime Minister Murayama in order to have the report accepted by him.

Throughout its text, the report does not touch on existing conditions related to basic policies, including the Constitution. However, the questions asked of us at present are

rather what kind of country Japan should become in the future; in this process, what role it should perform; and to this end, how the Constitution and given conditions related to past policies should be handled.

Without giving clear judgments with regard to these points, the report makes all proposals within the framework of the present Constitution. This is also hard to understand. Without a clear barometer of the image of the nation and national interests, the ideal form of defense capabilities also cannot become clear.

In particular, Japan's defense capability has long been a matter of concern to Asian countries. It also comes into question that the report does not present a clear view on what significance Japan's defense capability and its security policy have in its relations with Asian countries. Will Asia really stabilize just by changing Japan's defense concept? In addition, will it be possible to heighten Japan's security? Does this not represent Japan's self-conceited way of thinking?

Amid confusing and unclear international conditions, it is necessary for us to rethink national interests (in my opinion, they are mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution). National defense is for protecting national interests, and defense is a relative concept. Reviewing national interests and threats to them at this juncture is the very basis for considering next-era defense capabilities, is it not?

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